Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade by Sewalk, Stephen
Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 30




Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-
Trade
Stephen Sewalk
Daniels College of Business, University of Denver
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Oil, Gas,
and Mineral Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation













I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  The Threat of Global Warming 
There is a growing demand for domestic climate change 
legislation in the United States that will lead to significant 
reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG)1 emissions.  A recent 
publication by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) stated that fossil fuel consumption accounts for the 
majority of anthropogenic GHGs.2  If we fail to make significant 
reductions in GHG emissions, we are risking the future of our 
 
      * Stephen Sewalk, Ph.D./J.D., is an Assistant Professor for the Burns School 
of Real Estate and Construction Management, Daniels College of Business, 
University of Denver.  The author wishes to thank Ned Vanda and Paul 
Chinowsky for reviewing drafts of this article and Emma Tauchman for 
providing outstanding research assistance. 
 1. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1949 U.N.T.S. I-30822 
(defining “greenhouse gases” as “those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, 
both natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation”);  
see also David G. Duff, Tax Policy and Global Warming, 51 CAN. TAX J. 2063, 
2065 (2003) (explaining that different gases have different effects on global 
warming, so emissions are standardized to CO2 equivalents when measuring 
their effects on global warming). 
 2. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), SPECIAL REPORT 
ON RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION (SRREN) 
SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS (2011), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/news_and_ 
events/docs/ipcc33/SRREN_FD_SPM_final.pdf (stating that the contributions of 
individual anthropogenic GHGs to total emissions in 2004, reported in AR4, 
expressed as CO2-e were: CO2 from fossil fuels at 56.6%, CO2 from deforestation, 
decay of biomass etc. at 17.3%, CO2 from other sources at 2.8%, CH4 at 14.3%, 
N2O at 7.9%, and F-gases at 1.1%). 
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environment.  Global climate change threatens to bring on 
catastrophic devastation to our entire planet’s resources.3  This 
threat has been a major push for climate change legislation in the 
United States.4  In order to reduce GHG emissions at the lowest 
possible cost, lawmakers need to adopt a climate change policy 
with economic incentives.5  To meet the challenge of reducing 
GHG emissions, innovation within the energy industry is 
necessary to promote development in cleaner production.6  The 
cost of such innovation plays a large role in managing this issue. 
B.  The Need for Change: The Push for Climate Change 
 Legislation 
Two distinct proposals have been made to reduce GHG 
emissions: a carbon tax and cap-and-trade.  Cap-and-trade has 
focused on limiting emissions with the expectations that 
technology can actually do so without resulting in prices for 
carbon being so high that either economic growth is impacted or 
emissions are not reduced.7  The carbon tax proposals on the 
other hand claim that a tax on carbon would reduce demand for 
carbon intensive items thereby reducing total emissions while 
 
 3. See William Collins et al., The Physical Science Behind Climate Change, 
SCI. AM., Oct. 6, 2008, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=science-
behind-climate-change (providing a briefing of the science of climate change). 
 4. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A NEW 
ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING AMERICA’S PROMISE 1, 21 (2009), available at 
http://gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy10/pdf/fy10-newera.pdf (stating that “[t]he 
Administration is developing a comprehensive energy and climate change plan 
to invest in clean energy, end our addiction to oil, address the global climate 
crisis, and create new American jobs that cannot be outsourced.”). 
 5. Barry Anderson et al., Technological Change and the EU ETS: The Case 
of Ireland 2 (Ctr. for Res. on Energy & Envtl. Econ. & Policy at Bocconi Univ., 
Working Paper No. 43, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1855495. 
 6. Suzanne Scotchmer, Cap-and-Trade, Emissions Taxes, and Innovation, 
11 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 1 (2011). 
 7. See generally Miles Young, Beautifying the Ugly Step-Sister: Designing an 
Effective Cap-and-Trade Program to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 2009 
BYU L. REV. 1379 (2009); Robert N. Stavins, Addressing Climate Change with a 
Comprehensive U.S. Cap-and-Trade System, 24 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 298 
(2008); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address 
Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2008). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/8
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refunding the tax to consumers.8  Neither of these proposals 
specifically addresses carbon emissions nor show how emissions 
are actually reduced.  This paper introduces carbon tax with 
reinvestment, whereby all taxes raised by the carbon tax are 
reinvested into specific low-to-no carbon energy sources that 
result in a systematic reduction in total carbon emissions.  The 
results are stunning and are shown in the models, resulting in a 
significant extended reduction in carbon emissions.  More 
importantly, the proactive nature of the tax structure results in 
significant new construction, job creation, and eventually a 
reduction in total tax due to the rapidly declining emissions.  The 
tax is structured so that there is no incentive to invest in 
production in non-compliant regions, resulting in a worldwide 
abatement effort for GHG emissions. 
In Part I of this paper, I will review the current opinion 
surrounding carbon tax proposals as they appear in the 
literature.  Part II will provide an overview of the current cap-
and-trade proposals.  Part III will introduce a carbon tax with 
reinvestment.  In Part IV of this article, I will review the leading 
proposals arguing that a carbon tax is superior to cap-and-trade.  
And finally, for Part V, I will explain why a carbon tax with 
reinvestment trumps cap-and-trade. 
II.  CARBON TAX 
A.  What is a Carbon Tax? 
A carbon tax is a tax that is levied per ton of emissions of 
carbon dioxide.9  This form of climate change regulation is 
recognized in the literature as being the simplest way to reduce 
carbon emissions.10  Carbon taxes act as a means of internalizing 
negative externalities.11  Those who emit carbon through 
 
 8. See generally Michael J. Waggoner, The House Erred: A Carbon Tax is 
Better than Cap and Trade 1261 (U. of Colo. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 09-
18, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1489592; Gilbert Metcalf & 
David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax (John M. Olin L. & Econ., Working 
Paper No. 447, 2009). 
 9. Young, supra note 7, at 1391. 
 10. Id.; Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 8. 
 11. See Duff, supra note 1, at 2069. 
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consumption, production, and distribution create negative 
externalities in the form of pollution that affects all of society.  
Currently, those polluters are doing so with no repercussions.  
Through taxation, the polluters internalize those externalities.  
From an economic standpoint, this internalization through 
taxation is a justifiable reason to impose a carbon tax.12  From an 
environmental standpoint, a carbon tax implements the “polluter 
pays principle,” as included in Principle 16 of the Rio 
Declaration.13  In short, this means that whoever causes the 
pollution should have to bear the costs of the harm caused, as 
well as the cost of minimizing future harm.14 
B.  Internalizing the Negative Externalities 
Surprisingly, politicians are typically not supporters of a 
carbon tax.  Carbon taxes force products to reflect their negative 
environmental impacts, they encourage technological innovation, 
they generate revenue, and they are easy to administer.15  
Supporters of a carbon tax also cite the advantages of the tax for 
its lack of interference with other regulatory instruments, the 
clear message being sent by the government, and the price 
stability.16 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de 
Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration Principle 16, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) (The Rio Declaration is a 
declaration of 27 principles adopted by the UNCED and endorsed by the U.N. 
General Assembly.  The principles of the Rio Declaration are the result of 
compromise between developed and developing nations.). 
 14. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), ECONOMIC 
INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 27 (1989) (noting “the polluter 
should bear the cost of measures to reduce pollution decided upon by public 
authorities to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state”). 
 15. Young, supra note 7 (citing Michael J. Zimmera, Carbon Tax: Ready for 
Prime Time?, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. POL’Y 67 (2008);  Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Energy Independence and Global Warming, 37 ENVTL. L. 595 (2007)). 
 16. See, e.g., Roberta Mann, To Tax or Not to Tax Carbon - Is That the 
Question?, 24 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 44 (2009). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/8
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C.  The Importance of a Revenue-Neutral Tax 
Current carbon tax proposals call for a revenue-neutral tax 
with two favored approaches for revenue returns.17  The first 
approach is an equal dividends approach, where the revenues 
would be rebated directly to all U.S. residents in equal portions.18  
The second approach is a “tax shift” approach.  This method takes 
each dollar of the tax’s revenue and reduces existing taxes by that 
dollar amount.  Taxes facing reduction could be federal payroll 
taxes or state sales taxes.19  These forms of revenue-neutrality 
help to encourage public acceptance of the tax and to prevent the 
tax from taking on a regressive form.20  However, the approaches 
listed above do not assist in the overarching goal of emission 
reductions. 
Prior to the creation of the European Union Emission 
Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), the European Commission proposed a 
region-wide carbon tax.21  The tax was poorly received by the EU 
members because they saw the proposal as a threat to their 
countries’ autonomy, as taxation had been firmly held to be a 
sovereign right for those countries.22  Nonetheless, all twenty-
seven countries of the EU have some form of energy tax, and the 
European Commission has issued several directives 
recommending energy taxes in addressing climate change.23  The 
United States does not have to overcome the issue of state 
sovereignty regarding excise taxes.24  However, the United States 
is plagued by social disdain of paying taxes.  This fact is obviated 
 
 17. Pricing Carbon Efficiently and Equitably, CARBON TAX CTR., http:// 
www.carbontax.org/introduction (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
 18. Id. (providing a comparison to Alaska’s North Slope oil revenues). 
 19. Id.; see also Gilbert E. Metcalf, Paying for Greenhouse Gas Reductions: 
What is the Role of Fairness?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 393 (2011) (advocating 
the tax-shift approach for revenue neutrality). 
 20. Metcalf, supra note 19, at 400 (explaining the importance of avoiding a 
regressive tax). 
 21. F. J. Convery, Origins and Development of the EU ETS, 43 ENVTL. & RES. 
ECON. n. 3, 391 (2009). 
 22. Id. at 393. 
 23. Id. (stating that the United States, comprised of fifty states within one 
nation, does not have the same taxation issues with regards to a threat of state 
autonomy). 
 24. See generally I.R.C §§ 861, 4053(9) (2009). 
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in political elections.  As historian Robin Einhorn wrote, 
“Americans hate everything about taxation with a passion. . . .  
No campaign promise works better than the promise to cut 
taxes.”25  Nevertheless, taxation is considered a necessary burden 
by the public in order to obtain revenues to finance public 
necessities.26  In this case, the public necessity takes the form of 
reducing harmful emissions in order to preserve the health of our 
nation and our environment.  Additionally, the transparency of a 
carbon tax will assist in obtaining public support during 
implementation.27  This is contrary to a similar cap-and-trade 
bill.  A carbon tax meets the criteria of a climate change policy 
that can achieve ecological sustainability and political feasibility, 
despite the initial hesitation of the public.28 
In the existing literature, there are two recurring 
shortcomings regarding carbon taxes.  The first is the regressive 
nature of the tax, and the second is the lack of guarantee as to 
the true reduction of carbon emissions.  The first of these issues 
can be avoided by the methods of revenue-neutrality as discussed 
above.  The second issue is more pressing.  Current carbon tax 
proposals work off of the hope that taxation will discourage 
practices that emit carbon and push companies to invest in 
newer, cleaner technologies.29  New legislation must rely on 
nothing but fact when it comes to the effectiveness of a policy’s 
emission reductions.  For this reason, previous carbon tax 
proposals will not be sufficient. 
 
 25. Jonathan Mann, Why Americans Hate Paying Taxes, CNN, Dec. 17, 2010, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-17/us/jonathan.mann.us.taxes_1_tax-cuts-
boston-tea-party-americans?_s=PM. 
 26. Duff, supra note 1, at 2068. 
 27. Mann, supra note 16. 
 28. Samantha McCann & Richard P. Young, Path Dependence and Cap and 
Trade: Why We Need a Green Tax (W. Political Sci. Ass’n, Annual Meeting 
Paper, 2011). 
 29. See generally Florian Habermacher & Gebhard Kirchgässner, Climate 
Effects of Carbon Taxes, Taking into Account Possible Other Future Climate 
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III.  CAP-AND-TRADE 
A.  What is a Carbon Tax? 
In a cap-and-trade program, a government agency 
establishes a limit, or cap, on regulated polluters’ carbon 
emissions and then allocates set numbers of emission allowances 
among them.  Trading of these allowances determines the value 
of allowances and creates a market between polluters.30  If 
targeted polluters surpass this cap, they must purchase reduction 
credits from other regulated polluters who go below their 
assigned caps.31  A cap-and-trade program has been the leading 
proposal for climate change legislation in the United States.32  
The most recent cap-and-trade proposal was the American Clean 
Energy and Security Act, also known as the Waxman-Markey 
bill.33  This bill was designed to establish an emissions trading 
plan in the United States that would reduce carbon emissions 
and create clean energy jobs.34  The Waxman-Markey bill was 
approved by the House of Representatives on June 26, 2009, but 
died in the Senate in that same year.35  To date, the U.S. 
Congress has not passed any federal legislation on climate 
change.36  However, political figures favor the idea of cap-and-
trade because the cap-and-trade system is not called a “tax,” and 
the government can decide where to allocate emission 
 
 30. Gilbert E. Metcalf et al., Analysis of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Tax Proposals 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 13980, 2008). 
 31. David M. Driesen, Capping Carbon (Syracuse Univ. Coll. of Law, 
Working Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1463016. 
 32. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global 
Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming 
than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 5 (2009). 
 33. H.R.2454 - The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, OPEN 
CONG., http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h2454/actions_votes (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2013). 
 34. See Robert Stavins, The Wonderful Politics of Cap-and-Trade: A Closer 
Look at Waxman-Markey, BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L AFFAIRS (May 27, 2009), 
http://www.robertstavinsblog.org/2009/05/27/the-wonderful-politics-of-cap-and-
trade-a-closer-look-at-waxman-markey/. 
 35. H.R.2454, supra note 33. 
 36. Id. 
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allowances.37  Environmentalists favor this system for the 
absolute quantity restrictions on carbon emissions.38  The money-
making potential of a market-based program leads to support 
from many industry groups.39  Groups supporting this type of 
program rely on the following assumptions of the cap-and-trade 
system: (1) carbon emissions below a certain level (that level 
which is set by the assigned cap) do not cause undue harm to the 
environment, and (2) a market in pollution allowances (the trade 
aspect) is “the most cost-effective means of reducing pollution to 
the predetermined level. . . .”40 
A cap-and-trade system gives the benefit of increasing the 
limits on carbon dioxide emissions, allowing for flexibility in the 
market.41  This flexibility allows for an ease of transition for 
affected facilities.  This appeal of the cap-and-trade system 
obscures the fact that a cap-and-trade system is not the best 
option to combat climate change.  First of all, even if Congress 
were to pass cap-and-trade legislation tomorrow, it will be years 
before a cap-and-trade system would be put into effect.42  The 
integral delays of our nation’s rulemaking process would stall the 
date at which the cap-and-trade could become operational.  
Second, deciding on an appropriate baseline for emission 
reduction targets, how allowances are distributed, and the all-
important decision regarding the use of offsets would further 
challenge an early start date.  Third, there is no certainty of the 
price required to achieve the promised reduction levels set forth 
by the reduction cap.43  The carbon market is one of volatile price 
 
 37. See Roberta F. Mann, The Case for the Carbon Tax: How to Overcome 
Politics and Find Our Green Destiny, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10118, 
101120 (2009). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32, at 5. 
 40. Mann, supra note 37, at 10120. 
 41. See generally Young, supra note 7. 
 42. See Zhong Xiang Zhang, The U.S. Proposed Carbon Tariffs, WTO 
Scrutiny and China’s Response 10 (Int’l Econ. & Econ. Policy, Working Paper, 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1517488 (describing the four years 
of preparation required before implementing the U.S. SO2 Allowance Trading 
Program and the two years to establish the EU-ETS). 
 43. See Jon Strand, Strategic Climate Policy with Offsets and Incomplete 
Abatement:  Carbon Taxes Versus Cap-and-Trade 2-3 (The World Bank, Dev. 
Research Grp., Env’t & Energy Team, Working Paper No. 5675, 2011). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/8
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shifts.  If the price of carbon is too high, there will be pressure to 
relax the cap.44  Too much relaxation in this cap abolishes the 
carbon market. 
a. Why is Cap-and-Trade so Popular? 
An upstream, economy-wide cap-and-trade system has been 
suggested as the best approach for short-to-medium term climate 
change regulation in the United States.45  This proposal creates a 
system that includes a course of caps that begin modestly and 
gradually lower over time.46  It is suggested that this type of cap-
and-trade will create a long-run price signal that will encourage 
investment.47  Included in this proposal are certain mechanisms 
to protect against cost uncertainty, as well as linkages with the 
climate policies of other countries.48  It is argued that this 
proposed cap-and-trade system will provide the option to alleviate 
economic impacts through the distribution of emission 
allowances, and this will lead to public consent to reduce 
emissions.49  This proposal of a cap-and-trade system that 
maximizes emission reductions and minimizes public cost is an 
effective approach.  Cap-and-trade can do a very good job of 
reducing carbon emissions when we are certain of the demand for 
emissions, when we regulate those emissions flawlessly, and 
when all emission allowances are auctioned off.50  However, if 
there exists uncertainty in the demand for producing emissions, 
and if there are difficulties in monitoring and regulating emission 
permits, the cap-and-trade proposal will lose its viability.51  If 
politics interferes in the dispersal of permits, this viability will be 
further weakened.52 
 
 44. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32, at 6. 
 45. Stavins, supra note 7, at 6. 
 46. See id. at 2. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Philip I. Levy, The Carbon Tax/Cap-and-Trade Royal Rumble, FOREIGN 
POL’Y, May 13, 2009, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/05/13/the_ 
carbon_taxcap_and_trade_royal_rumble. 
 51. Id. at 1. 
 52. Id. 
9
 2013] CARBON TAX WITH REINVESTMENT 589 
 
This described cap-and-trade system identifies the 
importance of low carbon technologies for cost management in 
emission reductions.53  The price signals provided by caps 
extending decades into the future will incentivize the 
development and use of these technologies.54  It is this assumed 
reaction that will lower future costs of achieving those reductions 
set by the decreasing cap.  Due to the uncertainties surrounding 
this idea, additional policies are needed to provide further 
government funding and/or increased incentives for private 
funding in research and development.55  These policies include 
multi-year compliance periods, banking and borrowing 
provisions, a cost containment mechanism to prevent extreme 
pricing, and the availability of offsets for carbon capture and 
sequestration.56  In sum, this type of cap-and-trade system 
introduces significant complexity. 
It is very important to consider cost when setting emission 
standards under a cap-and-trade system.57  Traditional 
environmental law typically does not consider cost when setting 
environmental standards.58  This is demonstrated by the national 
ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act.  Like the 
goal of GHG emission reductions, the standards set by the Clean 
Air Act are established to protect human health.59  For this 
reason, the Supreme Court has held that the United States’ 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) cannot consider cost 
when setting these standards.60  The clash of cost consideration 
and environmental standards does not fit in well with the 
aforementioned cap-and-trade proposals.61  For cap-and-trade to 
 
 53. Stavins, supra note 7, at 5. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 9. 
 57. See Driesen, supra note 31, at 19; see generally Richard S.J. Tol, The 
Polluter Pays Principle and Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate Change: An 
Application of Fund (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Nota di Lavoro, Working 
Paper No. 88.2006, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=907456. 
 58. Driesen, supra note 31, at 20. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (holding 
that section 109(b) bars consideration of cost in setting national ambient air 
quality standards). 
 61. Stavins, supra note 7, at 46. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/8
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work, both costs and environmental standards must maintain a 
stabilized state.  Because of cap-and-trade’s significant 
complexity, this is an unlikely feat. 
Cap-and-trade supporters argue that cap-and-trade is the 
only proposal with a political chance.62  It is true that people do 
not want to have to pay to pollute, but how does cap-and-trade 
circumvent this issue?  In truth, this factor is only temporarily 
overcome by the absence of the word “tax.”  The signal sent by a 
carbon tax is one that is very clear: pollution results in a negative 
externality imposed on others, so polluters should be forced to 
internalize the cost of their pollution by paying a tax.63  Even if 
people are willing to pay the carbon tax, the intended message is 
clear. 
Despite common belief, cap-and-trade may send a very 
ambiguous message in terms of emission reductions.64  The goal 
is to reduce GHG emissions, but this goal is achieved either by 
requiring polluters to purchase the right to pollute or, in the case 
of free allowance distribution, use permits to pollute for free.65  
Cap-and-trade programs that auction off all emission allowances 
give the same message of internalizing the externalities.66  
However, where allowances are distributed for free, the message 
is more ambiguous.  In a sense, the government is giving 
permission to pollute in the form of emission allowances.  Finally, 
the wording surrounding both cap-and-trade and carbon tax 
emission requirements sends different signals.  Arguably, the 
biggest barrier of implementing a carbon tax is the societal 
apprehension toward paying taxes.67  In the case of sending a 
signal to polluters, the word “tax” sends a stronger, more severe 
 
 62. Levy, supra note 50, at 44. 
 63. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32, at 44. 
 64. See Driesen, supra note 31 (addressing the problematic widespread 
acceptance of cap-and-trade programs resulting in an automatic reduction in 
carbon emissions). 
 65. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32, at 44. 
 66. See id. 
 67. Id. at 44-45; see also Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and 
Regulatory Choice, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313 (2006); Janet E. Milne, 
Environmental Taxation in the United States: The Long View, 15 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 417, 419 (2011) (listing failed attempts at environmental taxes on 
environmentally damaging activities). 
11
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signal to polluters than phrases like “the purchase price for a 
right to pollute.”68  Phrases like this are designed by legislators to 
remove the stigma surrounding pollution.69  However, 
governmental condemnation of pollution sends the message that 
pollution is bad and that methods of development and production 
that reduce carbon emissions should be favored.70  Alternatively, 
it can be argued that the lack of a stigma gives the opposite 
signal: the purchase price for a “right to pollute” puts less 
demand on society’s need to reduce emissions.71  Overall, the 
signal sent out to polluters is not nearly as important as the 
reductions in carbon emissions.  If cap-and-trade is going to 
successfully reduce emissions, it will have to raise the cost of 
emissions.72  Support may be obtained by hiding this fact, but 
this deceptive approach is not ideal for a long-term environmental 
policy.73 
b. Cap-and-Trade and the Economy 
Furthermore, in times of recession and slow economic 
growth, like our nation is currently experiencing, a cap-and-trade 
system will increase the burden on our economy.  Cap-and-trade 
is designed to increase the cost of energy.74  During this economic 
crisis, an energy policy that does not encourage a reduction in 
production costs is the wrong choice.  A cap on emissions requires 
companies to increase costs to consumers in order to compensate 
for the costs of purchasing emissions allowances.75  These 
additional costs will lead to a decrease in energy demand that 
occurs simultaneously with an increase in the cost of energy, so 
 
 68. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32, at 44. 
 69. Nash, supra note 67, at 325-26. 
 70. See id. at 326. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Levy, supra note 50, at 2. 
 73. Nash, supra note 67 (providing a deeper look into the public tendencies 
resulting from “framing effects” of climate change legislation). 
 74. See generally William Yeatman, Cap and Trade’s Economic Impact, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Mar. 19, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/united-states/ 
cap-trades-economic-impact/p18738 (offering a take on cap-and-trade’s impact 
on the current economy from the point of view of an Energy Policy Analyst with 
Competitive Enterprise Institute). 
 75. Id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/8
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companies will end up cutting jobs.76  Whether directly affected 
by job losses or the increased prices on energy and energy 
intensive goods and services, everyone will feel the impact of cap-
and-trade. 
Even in a booming economy, cap-and-trade is not beneficial.  
An emissions cap will force companies to spend significant 
resources to adopt cleaner means of production.  As mentioned, 
these adaptation costs will be placed onto consumers, increasing 
the price on all goods and services requiring energy as an input.77  
This price increase will make American goods less competitive in 
the world market.78  This will incentivize companies to produce 
overseas in a country with no cap-and-trade.79  As such, cap-and-
trade has the capability to impair even a flourishing economy.  In 
addition, there is no certainty that implementing cap-and-trade 
will result in real reductions of GHG emissions, particularly ones 
that the economy can afford. 
B.  European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme 
In its initial phase, the European Union’s Emission Trading 
Scheme (EU-ETS) covered a very limited number of markets.80  
Steelmakers were part of the scheme, whereas aluminum 
smelters were not, so they faced no reductions.81  The 
Commission is working to eliminate these disparities, but while 
they may continue to make the carbon market more equal, 
companies will continue to put the pressure on politicians to be 
“more equal than others.”82  Additionally, those companies that 
operate domestically, like power utilities, are able to pass on the 
cost of allowances to their consumers.  Those companies that 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Sergey V. Mityakov, Cap and Trade’s Economic Impact, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, Mar. 19, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/united-states/cap-trades-
economic-impact/p18738 (explaining the hardships of cap-and-trade in a 
booming economy). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See generally Stephen Gardner, The Winners and Losers of EU Carbon 
Trading, CLIMATE CHANGE CORP., Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.climatechangecorp. 
com/content.asp?ContentID=5654. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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work out of an international market do not have this convenience 
and experience greater difficulties in funding adaptation.83  In 
fact, the International Energy Agency (IEA) has determined that 
the power industry has achieved oversight profits from their 
participation in the scheme.84  Their allotted allowances paired 
with their ability to pass on their carbon cost have allowed the 
power sector to ride out the carbon market with little 
inconvenience while other sectors pay a heavy toll. 
a. EU-ETS: Setting a Precedent? 
The EU-ETS faced many problems during its first trading 
period.  To begin, the Commission reviewed each nation’s initial 
National Action Plan (NAP),85 in which each country described its 
proposed reduction levels and the number of freely distributed 
allowances it required.86  Unfortunately, the Commission had 
neither the time nor the technology to adequately assess the 
information provided in each NAP.  Despite the fact that the 
Commission was forced to rely on the accuracy of each nation’s 
assumptions leading to the proposed emission caps, the European 
Commission rejected more than half of those countries’ NAPs in 
order to avoid allocations that exceeded overall need.87  Though 
the task of the Commission was a formidable one, reduction 
targets were finally set.  However, the EU-ETS soon learned that 
set emission targets did not mean a guaranteed market or 
guaranteed emissions. 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Claudia Kettner et al., Stringency and Distribution in the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme: The First Evidence, 8 CLIMATE POL’Y 41 (2008) 
(explaining that the Commission guidelines for preparing the NAPs were 
created with the expectation that each EU member state had a similar 
interpretation of the EU guidelines.  It was expected that each plan would place 
caps of similar rigidity, and therefore avoid any evident disparities between 
countries.  As resulted in the data, variations of allowances and emissions were 
widespread.). 
 86. Joelle de Sepibus, Scarcity and Allocation of Allowances in the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme - A Legal Analysis 3 (NCCR Trade, Working Paper 
No. 2007/32, 10, 2007). 
 87. Id. at 10. 
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The verified data for the EU-ETS was released in April of 
2006.88  According to this data, 2,029 million tons of CO2 were 
allocated, but only 1,932 million tons were emitted, and only six 
of the twenty-four countries allocated less allowances than 
needed.89  After this data was released, the price of allowances 
fell drastically from almost thirty euros at the time of the release 
down to twelve euros in May of that year, before continuing its 
decline to under one euro in 2007.90  In all, this first trading 
period was marked as a failure and a carbon market collapse. 
Overall, the allocation methods did not stray much from 
those of the first trading period, including the free allocation of 
emission allowances.  Due to this, there had been little 
improvement.  The Commission tried to be stricter in its 
examination of the second period NAPs, but with lacking 
resources to evaluate reduction methodologies, the assessments 
proved to be inconsistent and limited.91  However, in this current 
trading period, the Commission has continued its attempts to 
resolve those inconsistencies that plague the system.  Recent 
revisions under the EU-ETS attempt to centralize the Directive to 
create a more harmonious system.  This includes the setting of 
caps, the allocation of rules, and the monitoring, reporting, and 
verification of requirements.92  While it has risen from the 
monumental collapse of the first trading period, after six years, 
the EU-ETS continues to battle the complications of cap-and-
trade’s significant complexities. 
b. Why the EU-ETS Will Not Work in the U.S. and 
What We Are Doing Instead 
To date, the EU houses the largest cap-and-trade system 
aimed at reducing carbon emissions.93  It is suggested that an 
 
 88. Id. at 14. 
 89. Id. (citing Kettner et al., supra note 85). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 14-15. 
 92. Sanja Bogojevic, The EU ETS Directive Revised: Yet Another Stepping 
Stone, 11 ENVTL. L. REV. 279, 280 (2009). 
 93. Gbenga Ibikunle & Andros Gregoriou, International Emissions Trading: 
A Survey of Phases of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 5 (Soc. Sci. Res. 
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EU-style arrangement of cap-and-trade is not likely to be feasible 
for the United States.94  The United States has much greater 
regional disparities in carbon emission intensities and income 
levels, creating extreme difficulties on the path of establishing 
cap-and-trade legislation.95  The individual states of the United 
States and the countries of the EU are designated as either 
“green” states or “brown” states.96  Green states have higher per 
capita income and lower emission intensities.97  Brown states 
have lower income and higher emission intensities.98  The EU-
ETS was initially established by only fifteen West-European 
states–each of which were considered “green” states.99  The EU-
ETS was able to expand to twelve more states because EU 
membership required them to do so, offering these “brown” states 
valuable economic benefits to compensate any economic risks 
taken by joining the scheme.100  Ten northeast states of the 
United States (all “green” states)101 have developed a cap-and-
trade program under their Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI),102 and California’s Assembly Bill 32 proposes a similar 
 
Network, Working Paper, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1952769. 
 94. David Wheeler, Confronting the American Divide on Carbon Emissions 
Regulation (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 232, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1824509. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1. 
 97. Id. at 1-2. 
 98. Id. at 2. 
 99. Id. at 3-4 (comparing the initial EU-15 to the U.S. RGGI states, 
acknowledging the successes of small, regional cap-and-trade systems). 
 100. Id. at 4. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See Fact Sheet: The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), REG’L 
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, INC. (2010), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/ 
RGGI_Fact_Sheet.pdf (noting that RGGI is the first mandatory, market-based 
carbon emission reduction program in the United States.  This cap-and-trade 
program has capped carbon emissions and intends to reduce CO2 emissions from 
the power sector by 10% by the year 2018.  The participating states include 
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New 
York, Rhode Island, and Vermont.  Because RGGI only limits emissions from 
the power sector, monitoring costs are low); see also  Lawrence Fogel, Serving a 
“Public Function”: Why Regional Cap-and-Trade Programs Should Survive a 
Dormant Commerce Clause Challenge, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (2010) 
(noting problems of RGGI’s design include a potentially severe leakage problem 
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strategy for that state.103  Unfortunately, the interstate 
disparities of the United States immensely surpass those of the 
EU.104  As noted by Wheeler, the United States does not have the 
resources to incentivize the “brown” states to join these cap-and-
trade programs, and without economic incentives, these states 
are not likely to accept limits on emissions.105  In a direct 
comparison, the United States’ “green” states make up only 32% 
of U.S. carbon emissions, so without the full participation of the 
“brown” states, carbon emission limits would only account for 
one-third of the United States’ emissions.106 
As we have reached a time of “do or die” in the eyes of 
environmentalists, we cannot afford to play with a system that is 
largely untested and very likely ineffective.  The United States 
used a cap-and-trade system for the reduction of acid rain in the 
1990s, but we have never used this type of system to curb 
emissions that come from such a variety of sources.107  The cap-
and-trade market for sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions was not a 
 
due to the regional nature of the program (as well as the interconnectedness of 
the electricity markets, and a very limited scope of coverage with its 
downstream monitoring)). 
 103. See Wheeler, supra note 94 (stating that California is also considered a 
“green” state).  California Assembly Bill 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act, 
was passed and signed into law in 2006.  The Bill sets the goal of carbon 
emission reductions into law, requiring that California adopt measures to 
reduce carbon emission levels down to the 1990 levels by the year 2020.  The 
Scoping Plan was adopted in 2008 and provides an outline for actions to reduce 
GHG emissions in California.  This Plan identifies cap-and-trade as one of the 
strategies for reducing GHG emissions.  The California Air Resources Board 
(ARB) has been working to design a cap-and-trade program through the 
Western Climate Initiative (a collaboration of six western states and four 
Canadian provinces).  According to Assembly Bill 32, the ARB must begin the 
adopted cap-and-trade program in 2012. See Cap-and-Trade Program, CA. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AIR RES. BD., http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/ 
capandtrade.htm (last reviewed Jan. 31, 2013); see also Chris M. Amantea & 
Rafael Figuerido, California’s Climate-Change Regulation and Related 
Regulations, Cal. Bus. Law Deskbook §48:2 (2010); see generally Stavins, supra 
note 7. 
 104. Id. at 4. 
 105. Wheeler, supra note 94. 
 106. Id. at 6. 
 107. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32, at 34. 
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true success, and in July of 2010, the sulfur market collapsed.108  
Sulfur dioxide emission allowances traded for as much as $1,600 
per ton before dropping to less than $3 per ton.109  In fact, many 
argue that the entire program had misleading environmental 
effects.110  The focus of the project was the reduction of acid rain 
through the reduction of SO2 emissions.  As a result, low-sulfur 
coal from the West was introduced to replace high-sulfur coal 
from the East and Midwest.111  While this achieved the desired 
reduction of SO2 emissions, this new coal introduced new forms of 
pollution from the need to transport this coal to the industrialized 
regions in the East and Midwest.112  Increased amounts of this 
coal are required to achieve the same level of energy, and the 
pollution associated with cross-country transportation increased 
overall carbon emissions.113  In conclusion, the failed SO2 market 
leads me to conclude that we have no experience with a successful 
cap-and-trade system. 
C.  Previous Cap-and-Trade Proposals 
A deeper analysis of the cap-and-trade system finds that the 
literature has not paid sufficient attention to the feasibility of a 
carbon cap-and-trade program.  During the 110th Congress, three 
climate change bills were considered in the U.S. Senate: the Low 
Carbon Economy Act of 2007 (the Bingaman-Specter bill), 
America’s Climate Security Act of 2007 (the Lieberman-Warner 
bill), and the Manager’s Amendment to the Lieberman-Warner 
bill (the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008).114  
These bills were broad-based, cap-and-trade climate change bills 
that, due to political disagreements and the overhanging 
 
 108. Joseph Bast, Cap-and-Trade’s Market Failure, AM. THINKER, July 28, 
2010, http://www.americanthinker.com/archived-articles/../2010/07/capandtrade 
_market_failure.html. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Kenneth R. Richards & Stephanie Richards, The Evolution and Anatomy 
of Recent Climate Change Bills in the U.S. Senate: Critique and 
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economic crisis, the Senate did not pass.115  In order to determine 
the best form of climate change legislation, previous legislation 
must be analyzed.  Identifying the key elements of climate change 
legislation and the policy principles for developing that legislation 
can give law and policymakers direction for the formation of new 
legislation, as well as insight into some of the pitfalls to be 
avoided.116  The Bingaman-Specter bill and both Lieberman-
Warner bills identify major issues to be addressed by any form of 
climate change legislation.  However, all three bills contain 
elements that require a great deal of additional refinement.  The 
Manager’s Amendment contains many sound climate change 
policy principles, but there is still a great deal of room for 
improvement.117  Unfortunately, the complexities involved with 
the implementation of a cap-and-trade program make it 
extremely difficult to draft an adequate bill. 
The Waxman-Markey bill introduced titles outlining 
strategies concerning clean energy, energy efficiency, reducing 
global warming pollution, transitioning to a clean energy 
economy, and providing for agriculture and forestry related 
offsets.118  Some of the key provisions of the bill included the 
following: (1) creating a combined energy efficiency and 
renewable electricity standard that would require electricity 
suppliers to increase the use of renewable electricity to 20% of 
their demand by 2020; (2) setting up a strategic plan to improve 
overall U.S. energy productivity by at least 2.5% per year by 2012 
and sustaining that improvement rate through the year 2030; 
and (3) establishing a cap-and-trade system for GHG emissions 
and setting goals for emission reductions from covered industries 
by 83% of the 2005 levels by 2050.119 
 
 115. Id. at 2. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 3 (listing some of the Manager’s Amendment policy principles 
considered “sound”). 
 118. Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural 
Resources Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405 (2011). 
 119. H.R. 2454: American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, 
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr2454#overview (last 
updated June 26, 2009). 
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a. Waxman-Markey 
Waxman-Markey was the leading cap-and-trade proposal to 
date, but it failed to pass through the Senate primarily due to the 
complicated and bureaucratic nature of the bill.  Prior to its 
failure, the bill was scrutinized for its potential effectiveness.  
The IPCC proposed that emissions should be reduced between 
25% and 40% below the 1990 levels by 2020 for the purpose of 
stabilizing GHG concentrations and to prevent further 
environmental damage.120  The enacted legislation would only 
achieve a maximum of a 23% reduction in emissions by 2020 and 
the cap-and-trade system would only achieve a 1% reduction from 
1990 levels by 2020.121  Other estimates of the legislation’s 
emissions reductions are significantly lower.122  The considerable 
uncertainty that surrounds possible climate change effects, and 
those information and technology gaps that have plagued past 
and present cap-and-trade systems are thought to be similarly 
present in the Waxman-Markey bill.123  These unresolved issues 
will not suffice in adequate climate change legislation. 
D.  International Agreements on Climate Change 
In response to the harmful effects of climate change, the 
United Nations adopted the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992.124  During 
the meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) in Kyoto, 
Japan, delegates agreed to a protocol to the UNFCCC that 
established legal commitments for industrialized countries and 
 
 120. IPCC, supra note 2. 
 121. John Larsen & Robert Heilmayr, Emission Reductions Under Cap-and-
Trade Proposals in the 111th Congress, WORLD RES. INST. (June 25, 2009), 
available at http://pdf.wri.org/usclimatetargets_2009-06-25.pdf. 
 122. See Greenpeace Opposes Waxman-Markey: Climate Bill Not Science-
Based; Benefits Polluters, GREENPEACE USA, June 25, 2009, http://www.green 
peace.org/usa/en/media-center/news-releases/greenpeace-opposes-waxman-
mark/ (releasing a statement announcing its opposition to the Waxman-Markey 
bill on the basis that the bill would fail to achieve the effective reduction in GHG 
emissions as proposed). 
 123. Larsen & Heilmayr, supra note 121. 
 124. Soledad Aguilar et al., Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., COP 17 Final, 12 
EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL., no. 534, Dec. 13, 2011, at 1. 
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countries in transition to achieve emission reduction targets.125  
These countries agreed to reduce their GHG emissions by an 
average of 5.2% below their 1990 levels during the first 
commitment period (2008-2012).126  The Kyoto Protocol was 
entered into force in 2005 and has 193 parties.127  This Protocol 
establishes a very complex and ambitious regime, but the states 
that have been willing to assume emission targets under the 
Protocol represent only about a quarter of the world’s GHG 
emissions.128  On December 31, 2012, the Kyoto Protocol’s first 
commitment period ended.129  In preparation for the expiration of 
this commitment period, an ad hoc working group was 
established in 2005 to negotiate further commitments for a 
second commitment period.130 
a. Bali 
In 2007, the COP 13 met in Bali, Indonesia and adopted the 
Bali Action Plan and the Bali Roadmap.131  The Action Plan 
focused on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, and long-
term cooperative action.132  The Roadmap set a deadline for 
concluding the negotiation for December 2009 at the Copenhagen 
Climate Change Conference.133 
b. Copenhagen 
During the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in 2009, 
the Copenhagen Accord was presented for adoption by the 
delegates.134  The Copenhagen Accord was a political agreement 
 
 125. Id. at 2. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Daniel Bodansky, W[h]ither the Kyoto Protocol? Durban and Beyond 12 
(Belfer Ctr. Sci. & Int’l Aff., Harv. Project on Climate Agreements, Policy Brief, 
2011), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21314/ 
whither_the_kyoto_protocol_durban_and_beyond.html. 
 129. Id. at 1. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Aguilar et al., supra note 124, at 2. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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that established a bottom-up approach to mitigation efforts in 
which countries define their own national climate change 
approach and pledge their commitment.135  Delegates at 
Copenhagen disputed the transparency of the negotiating 
process, and the Copenhagen Accord was not formally adopted.136  
Instead, the parties agreed to extend the time for countries to 
gather their national emission reduction targets and mitigation 
actions and prepare for the COP 16 meeting.137 
c. Cancun 
The U.N. Climate Change Conference in Cancun, Mexico, 
took place from November 29 to December 11, 2010.138  During 
this meeting, the parties finalized the Cancun Agreements.139  
Cancun formally puts the pledges of the Copenhagen Conference 
into U.N. documentation, although they may increase or decrease 
in the future.140  More importantly, developing countries agreed 
to look at ways they could reduce emissions in the future.  
However, those developing countries did not make specific 
pledges.141  The Cancun Agreements analyzed mitigation 
measuring, reporting, and verification, and addressed 
deforestation and forest degradation, the role of conservation, 
sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest 
carbon stocks.142  Finally, a new climate green fund was created 
to transfer money from developed countries to developing 
countries in order to reduce the impacts of climate change.143  
The Green Climate Fund was slated to begin in 2011; however, no 
specific amount of money was allocated to fund it.144  While 
Cancun touched on many important issues, the big issue of the 
 
 135. Bodansky, supra note 128, at 4. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Aguilar et al., supra note 124, at 2. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Bodansky, supra note 128, at 4. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Aguilar et al., supra note 124, at 2. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
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future of the Kyoto Protocol was extended to the U.N. Climate 
Change Conference in Durban.145 
d. Durban 
The outcomes of the U.N. Climate Change Conference in 
Durban yielded a decision by the parties to adopt a universal, 
legally-binding framework on climate change to be completed by 
2015 and enacted in 2020.146  This agreement, known as the 
Durban Platform, is noted for including the United States (which 
did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol) and the developing countries of 
China and India.147  The Durban Conference also showed 
progress regarding the Green Climate Fund;148 adopting a 
management framework with an objective to raise $100 billion a 
year by 2020 to assist developing countries in adaptation and 
mitigation practices to counter global warming and climate 
change.149 
As seen through the scheme of International Climate Change 
agreements, the intention of the UNFCCC is pure, and the efforts 
are correctly aimed.  The difficulties show up in the attempts to 
bring the world together and form binding agreements.  A 
common trend in these international climate change conferences 
is to push back difficult decisions.  While we may be headed down 
a worthy path, these current global climate change initiatives are 
working too slowly. 
IV. CARBON TAX IS SUPERIOR TO CAP-AND-TRADE 
The global climate change problem continues to apply 
pressure for the enactment of climate change legislation.  In the 
following paragraphs, I will further expand on why a carbon tax 
trumps cap-and-trade in the following categories: (1) benefit 
certainty and cost certainty, (2) length of legislation, (3) 
implementation, (4) enforcement, (5) revenue and reinvestment, 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 3. 
 147. Aguilar et al., supra note 124, at 4. 
 148. Id. at 5. 
 149. Id. at 2. 
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(6) coordination with existing laws, and (7) environmental 
effectiveness.  This tax should be implemented as soon as possible 
in the form of a carbon tax with reinvestment. 
A.  Benefit Certainty and Cost Certainty 
Cap-and-trade and carbon tax are both market-based 
mechanisms designed to reduce GHG emissions, but it is an 
ongoing debate as to which of these two mechanisms will prevail 
in climate change legislation.  There are many differences 
between cap-and-trade and carbon tax, but at the heart of the 
issue is one fundamental difference: benefit certainty versus cost 
certainty. 
A cap-and-trade system places a cap on the level of emissions 
permitted.  This cap states that its implementation will provide 
environmental benefits from the achieved emission reductions.  
This is referred to as “benefit certainty.”150  A carbon tax sets up 
an exact price on carbon emissions.  This amount is set in 
advance so that emitters are always aware of the price of 
emissions.  Thus, the carbon tax provides “cost certainty.”151  
Cap-and-trade does not give cost certainty, as the market may 
fluctuate over time.152  In theory, the price stability of a carbon 
tax could prove as much as five times more cost-efficient than 
cap-and-trade.153  Additionally, the “benefit certainty” of the caps 
is an unconvincing advantage if emissions are not actually capped 
at a sustainable level and if the regulations provide no incentive 
for over compliance, even when emission prices are very low.154  
Carbon taxes, on the other hand, provide no “benefit certainty,” 
though there is no question that they are able to maintain “cost 
certainty.”155  The argument over which “certainty” is more 
important becomes irrelevant when cap-and-trade becomes 
 
 150. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Kenneth C. Johnson, Beware of the Dogmatist: A Consensus Perspective 
on the Tax-Versus-Cap Debate (Working Paper Series, 2008), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1154638. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32. 
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plagued by political intervention and safety valves and is unable 
to provide the “benefit certainty” of a fixed cap.156 
B.  Length of the Legislation 
Cap-and-trade bills are infamously long and complicated.  
The Liebermann-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008 is over 
three hundred pages in length,157 and Waxman-Markey is almost 
500.158  This is appearing to be the norm among similar cap-and-
trade proposals.  While there are fewer carbon tax proposals, they 
are significantly shorter and simpler.  The leading carbon tax 
proposal, sponsored by U.S. Representative John B. Larson, is 
seventeen pages in length.159  Climate change laws must be 
specific enough to remedy the problems our country is facing.  
However, legislation that is too complicated with too much 
specificity will create additional problems.  The longer the text of 
the law, the less likely it will be that the text is read and fully 
understood by the public.160  Long, complicated laws tend to draw 
suspicion from citizens regarding hidden clauses, like the creation 
of benefits for favored parties, or disadvantages for those 
opposing the legislators.161  All in all, cap-and-trade bills leave 
wide gaps for modifications and loop holes. 
C.  Implementation 
Aside from the write-up, cap-and-trade is extremely 
complicated to enact.  The cap must be imposed “upstream,” 
which means that the majority of the population is only affected 
indirectly because the tax is applied on the producer rather than 
on the final product.162  Also, while the upstream approach 
 
 156. Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins, Economic Incentives in a New 
Climate Agreement (Belfer Ctr. Sci. & Int’l Aff., Working Paper, 2008) (prepared 
for The Climate Dialogue, Copenhagen, Denmark). 
 157. Richards & Richards, supra note 114. 
 158. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 159. Richards & Richards, supra note 114. 
 160. Waggoner, supra note 8, at 1261. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Aldy & Stavins, supra note 156, at 1 (defining the product cycle of 
fossil fuels.  “Upstream” monitoring occurs at the sites of fossil fuel suppliers.  
“Upstream” monitoring requires fewer monitoring sites and results in lower 
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reduces the complexity brought by a large number of sources, the 
system remains complex.163  First, the cap-and-trade system 
requires baselines to be set for the establishment of a cap.  Next, 
regulators must decide how allowances will be created and 
distributed.164  The options for this distribution include free 
dispersal or auctioned allowances.  Free allowance distribution 
requires regulators to decide which industries receive allowances, 
but an auction requires complex monitoring to prevent fraud.165  
Third, further monitoring must be set up for the trading of 
allowances.  Control must be stringent so that the same 
allowance cannot be used more than once.166  Enforcement 
policies must be implemented to penalize those that exceed their 
allowances.  Further, one must implement a transnational 
enforcement regime if allowances are traded internationally.  
Finally, provisions are typically set for the banking and 
borrowing of allowances.167  Some of these provisions also allow 
for a safety valve to prevent extreme cost uncertainty.168  If 
offsets are to be allowed for carbon sequestration and storage, or 
similar projects, this must also be included in a provision.  The 
many requirements of a cap-and-trade system create extreme 
complexities that take time to work out.  The more complex the 
program becomes, the more difficult it will be for the proposal to 
pass into law.  In all aspects, a cap-and-trade system is much 
more complicated than a carbon tax.  A successful cap-and-trade 
program requires intense monitoring and reporting mechanisms.  
Unfortunately, our current monitoring technologies are not 
sufficient to take on the task of such an expansive pollutant as 
carbon.169 
 
implementation costs but greater uncertainty.  “Downstream” monitoring occurs 
at the point of final GHG emissions.  This type of monitoring requires greater 
expenses, as the number of sites greatly increases through the product cycle). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 3. 
 165. Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 8. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Aldy & Stavins, supra note 156. 
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 169. Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 8. 
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D.  Enforcement 
Adding to the extensive list of the complexities surrounding 
cap-and-trade is the extreme difficulty of enforcement.  A carbon 
tax identifies every person as a polluter, whereas a cap-and-trade 
only identifies select industries as polluters.170  Under cap-and-
trade, monitoring creates many unseen costs and difficulties.  
Administrative costs are often overlooked, but remain crucial 
when looking at the costs of emission-reducing actions.  The costs 
of establishing the cap-and-trade program include, but are not 
limited to, educating the targeted industries, monitoring 
emissions and compliance, and enforcing the policy.171  To reduce 
costs as much as possible, regulators must strive for minimal 
administrative efforts.  This usually means that approaches that 
require monitoring fewer parties and use more readily available 
information are the most favored.172  This leads to a tradeoff 
between the extent of a program’s coverage of emission sources 
and the administrative costs in order to achieve administratively 
simpler programs.  New costs will continue to appear in the 
creation of a nation-wide cap-and-trade program, but an 
additional concern lies in our monitoring technologies.  In cap-
and-trade, an elaborate system would need to be created to 
distribute and collect allowances to prevent cheating.  This is an 
extremely difficult and complicated task.  Effective measures to 
penalize those that emit without allowances may be even more 
difficult.  Cap-and-trade will require the creation of a completely 
new governmental body to take on these administrative and 
monitoring activities.173  The carbon tax, on the other hand, can 
be enforced by the IRS and the EPA with their existing staff and 
extensive experience dealing with excise taxes and clean energy, 
respectively. 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Richards & Richards, supra note 114, at 6. 
 172. Id. at 5. 
 173. Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 8. 
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E.  Revenue and Reinvestment 
A carbon tax in any form will generate revenue.  As an 
example, a tax of $10 per ton of carbon (a very modest tax) is 
predicted to generate $50 billion per year.174  In theory, the 
higher the tax, the higher the revenue that will be generated.  
How this revenue is used plays a large role in the equity of the 
tax.  While carbon taxes are criticized for potentially having 
regressive effects, cap-and-trade also faces this burden.  In a 
performed study, U.S. households were broken down into income 
groups and regional groups.  The study captured regional 
differences in heating and electricity costs, with the results 
demonstrating that the distribution of tax revenues has a huge 
role in the regressive nature of the carbon tax.175 
Sound policy must take into account the political constraints 
that burden all new legislation.  Distributional issues, differences 
in values, or differences in beliefs of the programs’ outcomes can 
cause political indecision.176  Low-income households spend a 
greater percentage of their income on energy than do higher-
income households.177  This means that those lower-income 
groups will be hit harder by a rise in energy prices.  In addition, 
states that are more reliant on coal, like those in the Midwest, 
will have a greater role in carbon dioxide emissions reductions.178  
The best policies must accommodate these political issues, while 
not compromising the cost-effectiveness principles.179  Carbon 
taxes, with price stability, guarantee revenue that can be 
returned to the public in order to provide a payback for the 
taxation.180 
 
 174. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32, at 40. 
 175. DALLAS BURTRAW ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE INCIDENCE OF 
U.S. CLIMATE POLICY: WHERE YOU STAND DEPENDS ON WHERE YOU SIT (2008), 
available at http://www.mistra-research.se/download/18.87749a811cbd4c4fb48 
0001008/Burtraw+et+al+2008+a.pdf. 
 176. Richards & Richards, supra note 114, at 7. 
 177. See BURTRAW ET AL., supra note 175, at 1; see also Corbett A. Grainger & 
Charles D. Kolstad, Who Pays for a Carbon Tax? (Dec. 1, 2008) (on file with 
Univ. of Cal. at Santa Barbara, Dep’t of Econ.). 
 178. Richards & Richards, supra note 114, at 8. 
 179. See id. 
 180. Mann, supra note 25. 
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F.  Coordination with Existing Law 
New legislation in the United States must be aware of 
existing legislations and regulations to avoid conflict.  The Clean 
Air Act could prove to be problematic with new climate change 
regulation.181  In terms of international law, any new climate 
change legislation must be designed to accommodate existing 
international agreements to which the United States is a party.  
The legislation must also be sure to abide by those international 
trade laws set by the WTO.182  As it will be relying on existing tax 
laws and utilizing existing governmental bodies, a carbon tax will 
nestle comfortably within existing law.  Cap-and-trade, on the 
other hand, may face further complications in order to avoid 
potential conflict, especially if we intend to coordinate with the 
regimes of other nations’ programs, like the EU-ETS.183  
Exchanging allowances across borders will create immense 
enforcement difficulties as well as monitoring problems.  Carbon 
taxes are easily collected on imports, and because the tax is also 
imposed on domestic production, it remains compliant with the 
WTO trade laws.184   
G.  Environmental Effectiveness 
In terms of climate change, all players are polluters, but not 
to the same level.185  Overall, the scramble to create and enact a 
form of domestic climate change regulation has blinded some as 
to the true purpose of the regulation.  Climate change regulation 
is meant to mandate carbon and GHG emission reductions with 
the state of the environment and the public’s health as the main 
focus.  Unfortunately, the race to pass a new piece of legislation 
has given way to political influence that is skewing the goals of 
 
 181. Chris Amantea, Clean Air Act [1], Cal. Bus. Law Deskbook §44.5 (2010). 
 182. Cinnamon Carlarne, The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO: Reconciling 
Tensions Between Fair Trade and Environmental Objectives, 17 COLO. J. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 45, 71 (2006). 
 183. See Katie Miles, International Investment Law and Climate Change: 
Issues in the Transition to a Low Carbon World (Soc’y of Int’l Econ. Law, 
Working Paper No. 27/08, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1154588. 
 184. Carlarne, supra note 182, at 71. 
 185. Tol, supra note 57, at 1259. 
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proposed regulations.  For example, both carbon tax and cap-and-
trade bills have failed to give proof of any real emission 
reductions.  Carbon taxes work off the assumption that a tax, by 
increasing the cost of carbon use throughout the chain of 
distribution, will discourage that use and cause the public to find 
alternate means of production.186  Cap-and-trade assumes that 
market-based policies will provide strong incentives for the 
investment into new technologies, and thereby create an overall 
reduction in emissions.187  The problem with these assumptions 
is just that: they are assumptions.  There is no firm data to show 
that putting a price on carbon will reduce emissions.  The EU-
ETS has created a carbon market, but the successes are 
economical rather than environmental.188  The existing systems 
are not up to par.  What we need is something simple and 
feasible, but also something extremely effective at fixing the 
problem at hand. 
 
V.  CARBON TAX WITH REINVESTMENT 
A.  Everyone is an Emitter so Everyone Pays 
Existing carbon tax proposals, and especially existing cap-
and-trade proposals, are not capable of reducing carbon emissions 
with certainty.  New regulation must be proactive in nature, 
include all emitters, and guarantee real reductions in carbon 
 
 186. Waggoner, supra note 8, at 1259. 
 187. See generally Stavins, supra note 7; see also Tess Schwartz et al., Legal 
Issues for Carbon-Related Transactions: Regulations, Markets, Technology & 
Enhancing Value (Practising Law Inst., Corporate Law & Practice Course 
Handbook Series, No. 18722, 2009). 
 188. Data regarding the emissions reductions resulting from the EU-ETS are 
inconsistent due to the lack of technologies capable of precise monitoring. See 
Peter Heindl, The Impact of Informational Costs in Quantity Regulation of 
Pollutants: The Case of the European Emissions Trading Scheme 25 (Ctr. for 
European Econ. Res., Discussion Paper No. 11-040, 2011), available at 
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp11040.pdf (acknowledging the high costs 
and complexity of the technologies required for emission monitoring, as well as 
the lack of informational distribution among the countries of the EU-ETS.  
Heindl proposes that the lack of predictability of informational and abatement 
costs could cause firms to delay investments into new technologies). 
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emissions.  A better, more effective market-based approach for 
reducing carbon emissions is a carbon tax with reinvestment.  
This carbon tax with reinvestment would directly tax all carbon 
emitters through a downstream approach, as opposed to cap-and-
trade’s limited upstream proposals.  This tax accounts for the 
societal costs of carbon emissions, and through this accountability 
promotes emission reductions just like cap-and-trade.  However, 
the reinvestment part of the tax will offset any doubts regarding 
the social responsibility requirement of emission reduction 
proposals.  The monetary payment of a carbon tax is a payoff of 
the environmental and societal costs imposed from emitting 
carbon, and sends the message about the harm of carbon 
emissions.  If that is not clear enough, the carbon tax’s 
reinvestment into the immediate construction of environmentally 
friendlier energy production facilities will further emphasize this 
message. 
B.  How Does the Tax Function? 
A carbon tax with reinvestment is fundamentally simple.  A 
tax starts at $5 per ton of carbon contained within the product 
based on emissions intensity.  The tax is measured at the source, 
but carried downstream and paid at the register.  Based on 
emissions intensity, everyone is an emitter and therefore no one 
is exempt from the tax.  Then every year the tax rate increases by 
$5 per ton of carbon.189  Despite an analysis remarking on the 
ability of increasing taxes to reduce future- and short-term 
emissions,190 the carbon tax with reinvestment does not rely on 
public option to reduce GHG emissions.  The assumption that 
taxation will encourage voluntary innovation in the power sector 
is not sufficient.  To assure emission reductions, the revenue from 
the tax will be channeled to building new infrastructure for 
energy production.  Current power plants will be replaced by 
 
 189. See infra Figure 1, for the revenues calculated from the carbon tax, 
beginning at $5/ton in year 1 and increasing by $5/ton each year until the tax 
reaches $50/ton in year 10.  The revenues are calculated as a percent of U.S. 
GDP. 
 190. Habermacher & Kirchgässner, supra note 29. 
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nuclear, geothermal, solar, and wind facilities, among others.191  
There will be no added expense for the utilities, as they will not 
be the ones bearing the cost of construction, and neither jobs nor 
production will be lost.192  In fact, the construction of new 
infrastructure will create jobs, and the tax collected will pay to 
replace existing high emission power plant utilities.  Replacing 
high emission power plants with low-to-no emission power plants 
will rapidly force emissions down.  Over time, revenues will 
decrease even though the tax is increasing193 because the newly 
built, non-emitting energy facilities will not carry a carbon tax, 
and energy prices will continue to drop.  In twenty years, the 
United States could achieve a 38.67% to 74.91% reduction in 
carbon emissions across the building and utilities sector.194  
Carbon tax with reinvestment will bring about an extreme payout 
for all U.S. citizens.  This payout will come in the form of clean 
and cheap energy as the tax progresses and clean energy 
infrastructure takes over.  Also, regional disparities will be 
corrected by targeting those coal-reliant areas with the first bouts 
of infrastructure construction.  The dirtiest coal plants will be the 
first to be replaced. 
VI.  CARBON TAX WITH REINVESTMENT TRUMPS 
CAP-AND-TRADE 
A carbon tax with reinvestment maintains the ease of 
implementation and enforcement of previously discussed carbon 
taxes, and the progressive increase of the tax allows the market 
to adjust to the price change.  This tax with reinvestment would 
produce revenue that would be used for the immediate 
construction of alternative energy production.  Since the tax could 
 
 191. The logistics of this transfer of ownership go beyond the scope of this 
paper, but will be discussed in a separate article. 
 192. See infra Figure 2, for the Calculated Power Plants Orders in MWe, 
demonstrating the thousands of construction jobs that will be created in the 
creation of new energy infrastructure. 
 193. See infra Figure 1.  Once the tax peaks at $50/ton of carbon, the total tax 
collected declines rapidly as emissions decline. 
 194. See infra Figure 3 and Table 1.  Figure 3 uses the base case and shows 
how emissions decline for utilities and buildings, as well as how total emissions 
decline.  The table shows calculated emissions based on the time it takes to 
build power plants. 
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become effective almost immediately, the carbon tax with 
reinvestment would be the quickest way to reduce GHG 
emissions.  With the instability of energy prices and the economic 
recession occurring across the nation, proposals for additional 
taxation weighs heavily on the American people.  The cap-and-
trade system will act just like a tax, and, as stated, the political 
advantages of the cap-and-trade system are deceptive.  Both cap-
and-trade and carbon tax approaches will initially affect energy 
prices.  The difference, however, is that this carbon tax’s 
reinvestment guarantees that the energy prices will fall 
significantly as alternative energy projects continue to be built at 
no cost to the utilities. 
A.  Cap-and-Trade with Reinvestment? 
In theory, cap-and-trade can also be used to generate revenue 
that is equal to the amount generated by a carbon tax.195  If all 
allowances are auctioned, the revenue created would likely be 
equivalent to that of a carbon tax.  If this were the case, a 
reinvestment provision identical to that of my proposed carbon 
tax could be created for cap-and-trade.  However, all cap-and-
trade proposals introduced into Congress, those existing cap-and-
trade programs in the U.S. and abroad, and most academic 
proposals call for some free distribution of allowances.196  The 
EU-ETS distributed 95% of the allowances for free while most 
congressional proposals call for over half of the allowances to be 
free.197  The reason for this free dispersal is the attraction of 
complete governmental control of providing allowances to the 
sectors that are considered most important for our nation.  
Nonetheless, free distribution of allowances means less revenue 
generated.  This means that reinvestment would have little effect 
on creating clean energy.  Moreover, the appeal of free allowances 
seems counterproductive for the ultimate goal of emission 
reduction.  It is probable that some industries will receive too 
many allowances.198  This will negatively affect the trading price 
 
 195. Driesen, supra note 31. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
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of allowances, leading to a repeat of the EU-ETS.  Politicians in 
Europe created so many free allowances that the industries were 
not required to make any changes to their emissions.  The price 
on allowances was next to nothing, and the EU failed to meet its 
goals under the Kyoto Protocol.199  In terms of a carbon tax, the 
process of creating tax exemptions would be equivalent to the free 
distribution of allowances.  To maintain fairness and simplicity, 
the carbon tax with reinvestment will offer no exemptions.  The 
tax will be applied to all goods and services.  Everyone is a 
polluter, so everyone will pay. 
The objective of the carbon tax with reinvestment is what 
makes this tax so much more appealing and feasible in combating 
climate change.  The carbon tax with reinvestment starts low 
($5/ton), increases annually until it reaches $50/ton to allow the 
construction market to adjust, the revenues peak and then begin 
to decline rapidly as emissions decline.200  As stated, excise 
taxation is not a new concept for the United States.  For this 
reason, no new organizations will be created for tax regulation 
purposes.  The carbon tax with reinvestment will be implemented 
and regulated by the IRS and the EPA, using the existing, 
knowledgeable staff. 
Our economy and lifestyle are dependent on infrastructure 
and energy.  A properly structured tax on carbon with the goal of 
building a new energy economy would protect our economic and 
national interests, create many jobs,201 and result in significant 
decreases in GHG emissions.202  Previously proposed carbon 
taxes did have “benefit certainty” because the price of emissions 
could not guarantee that emissions would be reduced.203  A 
carbon tax with reinvestment does not rely on public 
accountability for carbon emission reductions.  Instead, it relies 
on the construction and development of clean, alternative energy 
power plants for the reduction of GHG emissions.204  Until now, 
 
 199. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32, at 42. 
 200. See infra Figure 1, for Estimated Revenues. 
 201. See infra Figure 2. 
 202. See infra Figure 3, for Emission Reductions. 
 203. Mann, supra note 16, at 45. 




614 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30 
 
there was no obvious advantage to either system; one had to 
choose “cost certainty” or “benefit certainty.”  A carbon tax with 
reinvestment has both.  For this simple reason, we would be 
foolish not to immediately enact this tax. 
B.  An Example to Follow 
Greenhouse gases are not stationery.  They travel across the 
world, making climate change a global issue.205  Without the 
efforts of all industrialized and industrializing nations to reduce 
GHG emissions, the atmospheric concentrations of these gases 
will likely double the level of pre-industrialized emissions before 
the end of the century.206  There is a need for international 
coordination, and the Kyoto Protocol207 is not proving to be the 
answer.  This is just one more reason the carbon tax with 
reinvestment is a necessary solution for climate change. 
a. A Global Problem Requires a Global Solution 
The carbon tax with reinvestment will be imposed on all 
domestic products as well as imports.  The environmental cost of 
shipping products overseas is an area that is often overlooked.  
Agreements under the Kyoto Protocol have allowed fuel for 
international freight to avoid liability for emissions.208  The 
resulting issue is that goods exported across the world emit an 
overwhelming amount of GHGs without penalty.  A 2009 report 
by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) estimated that 
2.7% of the world’s total carbon emissions in 2007 were the result 
 
 205. Hans Gersbach & Noemi Hummel, Climate Policy and Development 
(CESifo, Working Paper No. 2807, 2009). 
 206. Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy 
Innovation to Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) 
(citing IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT (2007), available at 
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf). 
 207. See David Wooley & Elizabeth Morss, Global Climate Change, in CLEAN 
AIR ACT HANDBOOK § 10:1 (2011) (discussing that the Kyoto Protocol expires in 
2012, so negotiations are underway to reach a new agreement.  As of yet, no new 
agreement has been implemented, including any additional reductions to be 
required by Annex 1 and Non-Annex 1 countries). 
 208. Oliver J. A. Howitt et al., Carbon Emissions from International Cruise 
Ship Passengers’ Travel to and from New Zealand, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 2552 (May 
2010). 
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of international shipping.209  Burning oil in the form of heavy fuel 
oil, as well as marine diesel oil, releases large amounts of CO2, 
SO2, NOx, and hydrocarbons, as well as smaller amounts of 
particulate matter, into the environment, contributing to global 
climate change.210  The carbon tax with reinvestment will tax the 
amount of carbon emissions given off during shipping, along with 
the emission emitted during production. 
b. Carbon Tax with Reinvestment will Comply 
with International Law 
In his book, Socially Responsible Investment Law: Regulating 
the Unseen Polluters, Benjamin Richardson states that, “[t]he 
investment community continues to downplay inclusion of 
environmental and social criteria for consideration in corporate 
financing decisions.”211  Consistent with his thought is the 
argument that international investment law poses potential 
barriers to climate change regulation.212  Miles identifies several 
cases where investment laws have trumped environmental 
protection efforts,213 noting that in any conflict between the 
 
 209. Id. (citing CORBETT O. BUHAUG ET AL., INT’L MAR. ORG. (IMO), SECOND 
IMO GHG STUDY 2009, 6 (2009), available at http://www.imo.org/blast/blastData 
.asp?doc_id=12612&filename=GHG%20StudyFINAL.pdf). 
 210. Id. 
 211. BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON, SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT LAW: 
REGULATING THE UNSEEN POLLUTERS 6 (2008). 
 212. Miles, supra note 183, at 3. 
 213. Id. at 11-19 (discussing examples: (1) Metalclad Corp. v. United States of 
Mexico (citing Metalclald v. United States of Mexico, Award, 40 I.L.M. 35 
(2000)), where an American investor brought a claim against Mexico, alleging 
expropriation of investment and a breach of fair and equitable treatment 
standards regarding the declaration of an ecological preserve surrounding the 
hazardous waste treatment site.  The tribunal held that Mexico had not acted 
with the required levels of transparency consistent with NAFTA, and was 
therefore in breach of fair and equitable treatment standards.  (2) Azuris Corp. 
v. Republic of Arg. (citing Azurix Corp. v. Republic of Arg., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/12, Award (2006)), where Azurix contaminated the local water supply, 
causing the water to be undrinkable.  Local authorities imposed a fine on Azurix 
for non-compliance with its obligations of water quality, and Azurix filed a 
request for arbitration with the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) alleging that the action taken by the local 
authorities resulted in expropriation and breach of fair and equitable treatment 
standards.  Azurix also claimed that the water problems were the result of poor 
infrastructure due to the failures of the local authorities.  The tribunal, in short, 
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interests of investors and climate change regulation measures, 
very little weight is given to international environmental 
issues.214  The potential for claims of indirect expropriation, 
discriminatory treatment, and breaches of fair and equitable 
treatment threaten climate change mitigation methods that 
include the allocation of permits or “rights to pollute.”215  Under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade / World Trade 
Organization (GATT/WTO) regime, world trade must follow three 
fundamental obligations.  The first is the most-favored-nation 
(MFN) principle, which requires any advantage that is provided 
to a product to be provided to all like products.  The second 
principle, the national treatment principle, requires that foreign 
products be treated no less favorably than domestic products.  
The third principle is most relevant for cap-and-trade.  The 
prohibition on quantitative restrictions prevents countries from 
using embargoes, quotas, or licensing schemes on imported and 
exported products.216  With a cap-and-trade system, these 
international investment and trade laws are a true threat.  If 
 
held that the actions of the local authorities breached fair and equitable 
treatment.  (3) Methanex (citing Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M. 
1345 (2005)), where a Canadian investor challenged the health and 
environmental regulation in the United States after the Governor of California 
issued an order declaring that the Canadian ethanol manufacturer Methanex’s 
fuel additive would be phased out by 2002 for contamination reasons.  Methanex 
filed a complaint under NAFTA.  However, the tribunal rejected Methanex’s 
arguments.  Although the ultimate decision found in favor of California’s 
position, Miles points to the flaw of the system, seeing as the claim proceeded to 
a hearing at all.  (4) Santa Elena (citing Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa 
Elena, S.A. v. The Republic of Costa Rica, 39 I.L.M. 1317 (2000)), where a Costa 
Rican company that had been formed by American stockholders was 
expropriated by Costa Rica.  The issue was not the expropriation, but rather the 
amount of compensation due to the Company.  Costa Rica claimed the right to 
expropriate due to the ecological diversity of the surrounding land.  The tribunal 
held that the environmental objectives made no difference to the application of 
international investment rules.). 
 214. Miles, supra note 183, at 19. 
 215. Id. at 27; see also Jacob Werksman et al., Will International Investment 
Rules Obstruct Climate Protection Policies? An Examination of the Clean 
Development Mechanism, 3 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL. L. & ECON. 59 
(2003). 
 216. Erik P. Bartenhagen, The Intersection of Trade and the Environment: An 
Examination of the Impact of the TBT Agreement on Ecolabeling Programs, 17 
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 61 (1997) (citing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 195, art. XI [hereinafter GATT]). 
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imports were to be included, and thereby limited, under a cap-
and-trade system, an import quota would be implied.  Setting 
quotas violates WTO law.217  However, this will not be the case 
with the carbon tax with reinvestment.  With an across-the-board 
tax on set quantities of carbon, there are no issues of 
discrimination or equity, nor is there an issue of violating WTO 
laws forbidding taxes on imports, “in excess of those applied, 
directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.”218  As long as the 
taxes are paid, companies are under no obligation to change or 
experience indirect expropriation.  A key challenge is to ensure 
that the objectives of these areas of law are able to align, rather 
than cross, in order to move forward to reduce the effects of 
climate change.219  The simplicity of the system will allow the 
carbon tax with reinvestment to avoid clashing with the ever-
favored international investment laws. 
The effectiveness of a carbon tax with reinvestment on the 
international level could benefit the United States in several 
ways.  First, effective emission reductions would mitigate the 
negative environmental and social health impacts of climate 
change.220  Second, the tax will encourage economic 
advancements through infrastructure development and new job 
creation.  Finally, the international effects resulting from the 
carbon tax with reinvestment will assist the United States in 
maintaining its standing as a world leader.221 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The need for a climate change policy that truly addresses the 
issue of climate change is increasingly evident.  A carbon tax 
system is the best approach for the United States due to the 
simplicity of the design and ease of implementation, cost 
certainty, price stability, and the ability to generate revenue for 
the public good.  However, a carbon tax must assure reductions in 
 
 217. GATT, at art. XI: b. 
 218. GATT, at art. III: 2. 
 219. See generally Miles, supra note 183. 
 220. Young, supra note 7. 
 221. Id. 
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GHG emissions, and must target all polluters.  Until now, there 
has not been a carbon tax capable of these requirements. 
Literature argues that the cap-and-trade system is the 
superior choice because of the historical successes of the system.  
As stated, the U.S. acid rain program is one of those cited 
examples,222 but in reality, this is a poor example.  We have never 
had an economy-wide cap-and-trade system.  Currently, the EU-
ETS is the only comparable wide-range cap-and-trade example.  
However, it would be unwise to enact a cap-and-trade system 
based on the flawed cap-and-trade system adopted by the EU.223  
Conversely, our nation is very experienced with economy-wide 
excise taxes.  In his tax bill, Congressman Larson simply added 
three new, relatively short sections to the existing excise tax 
section of the Internal Revenue Code.224  With regards to carbon 
cap-and-trade, there is no adequate piece of legislation.  Previous 
proposals have shown just how difficult it is to draft a bill for cap-
and-trade, and even if a bill were to be flawlessly designed, it is 
suggested that it would take at least two years to get the program 
through Congress and set up for implementation because of the 
delays in rulemaking.225  A carbon tax, utilizing the existing 
excise tax laws, could basically be enacted tomorrow.  We have 
already delayed our efforts to combat climate change, and we do 
not have the time to continue the delay by attempting to 
surmount all the obstacles set out by cap-and-trade legislation.  
Immediate action can only be achieved by a carbon tax. 
The carbon tax with reinvestment implements a downstream 
tax so that no person will be exempt from taxation.  The revenue 
produced by the tax will be used for the immediate construction of 
low- or non-emitting power sources like nuclear, geothermal, 
wind, and solar facilities. 
With the creation of new, clean energy sources, the 
environment will benefit from the guaranteed emission 
 
 222. Scotchmer, supra note 6 (describing the Acid Rain Program). 
 223. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32, at 50; see also George Daskalakis 
& Raphael N. Markellos, Are the European Carbon Markets Efficient?, 17  REV. 
OF FUTURES MARKETS 103 (2008) (explaining why EU-ETS is not the success it 
claims to be). 
 224. Richards & Richards, supra note 114. 
 225. Zhang, supra note 42. 
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reductions.  The public will benefit from the cheap energy prices 
that will arise from the new infrastructure.  The economy will 
benefit from the creation of new jobs, and the nation will set a 
great example that will be followed by those nations that wish to 
continue exporting to the United States.  Because the successes of 
the tax will encourage other countries to implement similar 
regulations, the carbon tax with reinvestment goes beyond 
domestic emission abatement and offers a global solution to 
climate change. 
VIII. CARBON TAX WITH REINVESTMENT MODELS 
As shown in the data, I performed regulatory streamlining in 
order to achieve a graphic range and to play with regulatory 
risks.  The data is set-up to represent nuclear, wind/solar, and 
geothermal as the proposed clean energy facilities.  The baseline 
model (8-2-3) assumes  that the development of a nuclear power 
plant takes eight years (allowing two years for permitting, four 
for construction, and two for testing), two years for wind/solar 
(one year each for permitting and construction), and three years 
for geothermal (two years for permitting and one for 
construction).  Because processes can happen quicker or slower 
than expected, I included a range within the graph.  It can be 
noted that even with drastically slower results, the carbon tax 
with reinvestment’s impact is significantly better than the 
leading Waxman-Markey proposal.226  Preserving the traditional 
benefits of a carbon tax, the carbon tax with reinvestment is the 
best option for climate change legislation in the United States. 
  
 
 226. See infra Tables 1 & 2. 
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This figure indicates revenues collected each year as a percentage of GDP. 
Revenues are calculated as follows, starting at $5/ton of GHG emissions in year 1, 
rising by $5/ton each year until the carbon tax rate reaches $50/ton in year 10.  All 
goods and services, domestic and imported, are taxed based on emissions intensity. 
Emissions intensity is calculated as GDP/total economy emissions. From emissions 
intensity or $ of output per ton of emissions it is then possible to calculate the 
implied emissions for each good or service. 
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This figure shows the amount of new power plants that can be ordered and 
constructed each year using the revenues from the CTR. The construction line trails 
orders indicating that a plant ordered needs to be constructed which takes a 
significant amount of time.  While not calculated, every billion dollars in 
construction expenditure creates approximately 25,000 direct and indirect jobs, thus 
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Figure 3: Declining Emission Levels as Power Plants are Completed 
 
This figure shows declining emissions in the Utility & Building sectors as well as 
across the entire U.S.  This figure assumes the base case scenario, i.e. 8-2-3, where 
it takes eight, two, and three years respectively to order, permit, construct and bring 
online the nuclear, solar/wind, or geothermal power plant. 
 
 
Table 1: Building and Utility Emissions (United States) in Year 2032 
 
U.S. Building & Utility 
Emissions Based on 
Construction Strategy 
Building & Utility Emission Levels in 
Year 2032 Compared to 2013 
Business As Usual 120.82% 
Waxman-Markey 69.97% 
4-1-2 yrs 25.09% 
4-2-2 yrs 25.19% 
4-2-3 yrs 25.33% 
4-3-4 yrs 25.86% 
4-2-5 yrs 26.27% 
8-1-2 yrs 32.7% 
8-2-2 yrs 33.1% 
8-2-3 yrs 33.4% 
8-2-5 yrs 34.26% 
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8-3-4 yrs 34.4% 
12-1-2 yrs 46.77% 
12-2-2 yrs 47.54% 
12-2-3 yrs 48.00% 
12-3-4 yrs 49.67% 
12-2-5 yrs 49.9% 
12-4-6 yrs 55.3% 
16-1-2 yrs 57.77% 
16-2-2 yrs 58.75% 
16-2-3 yrs 59.29% 
16-3-4 yrs 61.20% 
16-2-5 yrs 61.33% 
 
Note: The emissions level for Building & Utility Emissions depends on the path 
taken in terms of how long it takes to permit, construct, test, and place new power 
facilities online.  As the tax structure moves from $5 to $50 per ton, with a 
maximum of $50 for the CTR (assumed to occur in year 10), the first number is the 
years for a nuclear power plant (with a range of 4-16 yrs), the second for solar/wind 
power plants (1-4 yrs) and the last for geothermal power plants (2-6 yrs).  These 
numbers include the time to build transmission facilities if needed.  Therefore, “4-
1-2” is interpreted as follows, the model assumes it takes 4 years to build nuclear, 1 
year to build large scale solar/wind, and 2 years to build geothermal power plants. 
Furthermore, all models exceed the proposed emissions reductions under Waxman-
Markey.  The primary difference is that these emissions reductions are achievable 
with today’s technology.  Rapid permitting and construction (4-1-2) results in 
emissions by 2032 being 25.09% of 2013 emissions, a reduction of 74.91%. 
 
Table 2: Total U.S. GHG Emissions in Year 2032 
Total U.S. GHG 
Emissions Based on 
Construction Strategy 
Total  Emission Levels in 
Year 2032 Compared to 2013 
Business As Usual 120.82% 
Waxman-Markey 76.95% 
4-1-2 yrs 46.49% 
4-2-2 yrs 46.57% 
4-2-3 yrs 46.66% 
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4-3-4 yrs 47.04% 
4-2-5 yrs 47.34% 
8-1-2 yrs 52.0% 
8-2-2 yrs 52.2% 
8-2-3 yrs 52.4% 
8-2-5 yrs 53.04% 
8-3-4 yrs 53.2% 
12-1-2 yrs 61.98% 
12-2-2 yrs 62.53% 
12-2-3 yrs 62.86% 
12-3-4 yrs 64.05% 
12-2-5 yrs 64.2% 
12-4-6 yrs 68.1% 
16-1-2 yrs 69.84% 
16-2-2 yrs 70.54% 
16-2-3 yrs 70.92% 
16-3-4 yrs 72.29% 
16-2-5 yrs 72.38% 
 
Note: This table includes all emissions (Buildings, Utilities, Transportation, and 
Land Use).  Rapid permitting and construction (4-1-2) results in emissions by 2032 
being 46.49% of 2013 emissions, a reduction of 53.51%. 
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